Risk vs. return: NATO soldiers persevere as their leaders ignore glaring signs of failure

It is a discouraging kind of progress for the Western intervention in Afghanistan. More and more officials are now openly conceding the scandalous weaknesses that are undermining the global effort to stabilize southwest Asia, particularly the Taliban leadership’s safe havens in Pakistan and the Karzai regime’s corruption-fuelled demise in Kabul. Trouble is, the West’s political leaders aren’t adapting and improving their strategies to counter these threats.

Along with their diplomats and generals, the top suits continue to send up PR smokescreens – excuses and promises and projections of success that are clearly at odds with reality.

One example: the under-performing army and police force of the Western-backed Kabul regime.

As documented over the past year here at skyreporter, both the size and capability of the Afghan National Army and Police have been shamelessly exaggerated by their foreign patrons (please see Recent Stories for Corruption & Cover Ups, Nov 14, 2007; Phoney War, Sept. 17; “Ghost” Policemen, Sept 10; and Rot Within The Regime, May 29, 2007).

The reason: the US and its NATO allies want to convince their edgy electorates that there’s light at the end of the Taliban-troubled tunnel, that the ANA and ANP will one day be able to stand and fight on their own.

In June, the US Government Accountability Office finally put that myth to rest. The GAO declared that despite the infusion of 16 billion American tax dollars since 2002, the US State and Defense departments “lacked detailed plans and cost estimates for completing and sustaining" the Afghan Army and Police.

The Americans dominate the international projects to build up the forces. While other NATO nations contribute significant funds and personnel, the Bush administration has insisted on absolute control.

The result? Only two of the ANA’s 105 units were found by the GAO to be "fully capable." Another 65 were still in training, while the rest were “capable” but only with NATO backing. The police were declared even less ready to perform.

Congressman Christopher Shays, a Republican, commented: "I don't see anything that makes me feel encouraged. And I think the thing that concerns me the most is that some of this appears to be extraordinarily bad planning."



The Pentagon took issue with the GAO assessment. But then came the mass breakout of captive Taliban fighters and criminals from Sarpoza Prison in Kandahar. Followed immediately by the Taliban’s move on the Arghandab Valley, just to the north.

Both events laid bare the ineptitude of the Kabul regime’s security chiefs, from the uninspiring Defence Minister, Rahim Wardak, right up to President Hamid Karzai.

Undeniably, Western political and military leaders must accept ultimate blame. Only two months prior to the GAO assessment, the US general in charge of the Afghan training program, Maj Gen Robert Cone, told journalists that the ANA had reached a strength of 61,000 men in arms, and would meet its target of 80,000 troops - 14 brigades and six commando battalions – by March, 2009.

One Western specialist familiar with the ANA training program terms Cone’s figures “grossly inflated,” and another example of PR being substituted for genuine results.